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Abstract
This paper uses a panel VAR model to improve upon the existing literature on interregional risk
sharing channels (e.g. Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha, 1996) in several respects. First, it
endogenizes the output process within a multi-equation framework, capturing the dynamic
feedback between output and various risk sharing channels. Second, in contrast to previous
research's analysis of static risk sharing in the presence of exogenous output shocks, it uses
impulse response functions to trace the role of each risk sharing channel over time, in the
presence of different structural shocks (temporary vs. persistent and output vs. risk sharing
channels). Third, the paper extends the risk sharing channels typically analyzed, by considering
the consumption smoothing role of changes in the nominal exchange rate and relative commodity
prices across regions. As a result, it is able to better address such policy issues as whether public
risk sharing has been a substitute or a complement for financial market diversification activities,
or whether the risk sharing role of exchange rate movements in Europe has been relatively
unimportant.
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1. Introduction
The European Union – like any other monetary union – entails virtually no role for
regional monetary policy, and a much limited scope also for regional fiscal stabilization. Hence
the monetary unification process has revived the attention to stabilization mechanisms able to
insure against the risk of idiosyncratic output shocks among the regions of a currency area.. Sala-
i-Martin and Sachs (1992) identified one such mechanism in the fiscal federalist structure of
countries like the United States; they calculated that the tax/transfer system in the US smoothes
up to 40% of an income shock to a state, and much less in Europe.1 Another channel of risk
sharing had long been identified by the finance literature: portfolio diversification. Since Arrow
and Debreu's work on equilibrium contingent claims it was clear that income accruing from
cross-regional asset ownership provides an important hedging against idiosyncratic contingencies.
French and Poterba (1991) were among the first to document the (scarce) extent of such risk
sharing in a few industrial countries, and van Wincoop (1994) confirmed the international
risksharing puzzle for the OECD.
These analyses were relatively unconnected until Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)
(henceforth ASY) – using a variance decomposition method – integrated all the risksharing
channels in a unique framework, and were able to calculate that an output change in a US state is
smoothed on average for 39% by interstate asset income, for 13% by fiscal risksharing, and for
23% by credit markets through interregional lending and borrowing.2 Sørensen and Yosha (1998)
(henceforth SY) repeated the analysis for the OECD and confirmed French and Poterba (1991)’s
home bias result, while revealing that all international smoothing – about 30% of a shock to a
country’s output -- takes place through domestic credit markets (and mostly through budget
deficits, as Arreaza, Sørensen and Yosha (1997) have documented). Several papers have refined
ASY’s methodology,3 and a map is being created of the scope and capability of shock absorption
of several countries, and regions therein. The pattern that seems to emerge is one of scarce
international risksharing, where home bias prevails and smoothing takes place essentially through
                                                       
1 von Hagen (1992) for the US and Bayoumi and Masson (1994) for the US and Canada found somewhat
smaller numbers, due to different econometric techniques employed.
2 It is not clear in the literature whether credit market smoothing is actually a form of risksharing, since it
takes place after the realization of the shock. See a brief discussion in Athanasoulis and van Wincoop
(1998).
3 For example, Alberola and Asdrubali (1997) added risksharing through migration; Asdrubali (1998)
distinguishes risksharing from intertemporal smoothing; Del Negro (1998) analyzes shocks to permanent
rather than current output; Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998) separate out the unpredictable output
shocks; Mélitz and Zumer (1999) add additional regressors. Other papers, such as Pellegrini (1998), and
Dedola, Usai and Vannini (1999) apply the setup to different countries.3
domestic saving; and richer interregional risksharing, where the role of capital markets can
sometimes be preponderant.4
The literature mentioned above shares most of the same assumptions (e.g., exogeneity of
output) and revolves around a basic setup (essentially static), which allows a simple
quantification of risksharing channels, but also leaves some important questions unanswered.
What kinds of shocks have the largest impact on consumption? How long does it take to absorb a
given shock to output? Does it depend on the risksharing channels? What is the dynamic role of
each risk sharing channel? What are the relations among different risk sharing channels? Are they
substitutes or complements? It is somewhat surprising – given the econometric structure of the
issue at hand – that the literature has so far neglected the use of dynamic and simultaneous
econometric models. To address these questions, this paper uses a dynamic and simultaneous
econometric model, namely a panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework, to generalize the
stochastic processes of the relevant set of variables.
As a consequence, some limitations of the static literature are overcome, and new issues
can be addressed. First, the model endogenizes the output process within a multi-equation
framework, capturing the dynamic feedback between output and various risk sharing channels.
Second, in contrast to previous research's analysis of static risk sharing in the presence of
exogenous output shocks, it uses impulse response functions to trace the role of each risk sharing
channel over time, in the presence of different structural shocks (temporary vs. persistent, shocks
to output vs. shocks to risk sharing channels). Third, the paper extends the risk sharing channels
typically analyzed, by considering the consumption smoothing role of changes in the nominal
exchange rate and relative commodity prices across regions. As a result, it is able to better
address such policy issues as whether public risk sharing has been a substitute or a complement
for financial market diversification activities, or whether the risk sharing role of exchange rate
movements in Europe has been relatively unimportant. We test our methodology on three groups
of countries/regions: the states of the USA, the 23 OECD countries, and the 15 European Union
members for which National Accounts data are available. Both for the US and for the OECD (and
EU15), we find that the dynamics of risksharing are much richer than the simple static model
could foreshadow. Some smoothing channels, like capital markets, exert their effect mostly on
impact, and then decline rapidly; some others, like the tax/transfer system, continue to absorb
output shocks years after they hit; still other channels, like the credit markets, start having a dis-
                                                       
4 Alberola and Asdrubali (1997) found that capital markets and credit markets in Spain smooth 23% of an
output shock each. These figures rise respectively to 63% and 20% for Italy and 48% and 56% for the UK
(Dedola, Usai and Vannini 1999).4
smoothing effect after two years, thereby offsetting any initial buffering action. Another example
of the complexity of risksharing dynamics comes from the analysis of real exchange rate changes
in response to output shocks: while on impact the real exchange rate exhibits a dis-smoothing
effect, over time it moves towards a neutral effect. Moreover, if we decompose its movements
into changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in relative prices, we find that the former
are responsible for the initial dis-smoothing, since prices adjust slowly. As prices catch up, the
effect of the nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate is neutralized.
As for the issue of exogeneity of output, we find that most of the changes in output at
annual horizon are caused by shocks to GDP, not by other structural shocks, including
consumption. In addition, using a VAR system with long-run (LR) restrictions, we are able to
distinguish the responses to permanent and temporary GDP shocks; we find that most of the
changes in output at annual horizon are caused by permanent GDP shocks. However, these results
also stem from the important fact that shocks to smoothing channels (including consumption) are
mostly offset by the other smoothing channels (also including consumption) at annual horizon;
for example, a change in the structure of financial markets affecting cross-regional income flows
tends to be offset by changes in the smoothing role of saving. We will derive policy implications
from this substitutability of smoothing channels, as well as from the dis-smoothing role of real
exchange rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the framework used so far to
estimate risk sharing channels, and then explains the VAR modeling and the empirical
methodology. Section 3 discusses the data and the basic results. Section 4 discusses the extended
models, which quantify the role of additional smoothing channels. Section 5 summarizes the
results and concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. The foundations of risksharing tests
Most of the literature on risk sharing considers a world of endowment economies ---
indexed by i --- lasting infinite periods – indexed by t. Each economy is populated by a
representative risk-averse consumer who maximizes his expected VNM utility in the face of an
exogenous stochastic output process, 
i
t GDP . Under CRRA preferences, it can be shown that, if
markets for contingent claims are complete,5 every representative agent will insure his future
                                                       
5 Market completeness is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for full risksharing. Several authors have
shown that even if only a limited number of stocks are traded internationally, under certain spanning
conditions full risksharing can still be achieved; for example, Duffie and Huang (1985).8
2.3. Dynamic Simultaneous Analysis of Risk Sharing
In this section we will generalize the econometric specification of models like (0.4) in
order to address the 3 novel issues we have in mind: dynamic responses to shocks, differing
responses depending on the nature of the shock, and endogeneity of the output process.
Models like (0.4) can be generalized by allowing dynamic (contemporaneous and lagged)
feedback among all variables, namely  GDP log D ,  GNP GDP log log D - D ,
GDI GNP log log D - D ,  C GDI log log D - D , and  C log D . In the following, we achieve that by
employing a VAR framework.
2.3.1. Structural Panel VAR
First we pool the data and estimate the following reduced form panel VAR.
yt
i = c + B(L)yt-1
i + ut
i,  (0.5)
where c is an n·1 constant matrix, yt
i is an n·1 data vector, B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag
operator L and var(ut)= S. Instead of explicitly introducing the time fixed effect in the model, we
construct data series as deviations from aggregate values.8 Based on the estimates of the reduced
form VAR, we recover the following structural form equation.
We assume the economy is described by the structural form equation
G0yt
i = d + G(L) yt-1
i + et
i (0.6)
where G0 is the n·n contemporaneous structural parameter matrix with 1’s in the diagonal, G(L)
is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, d is an n·1 constant matrix, and et is an n·1
structural disturbance vector. et is serially uncorrelated and var(et)=L. L is a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are the variances of structural disturbances, so structural disturbances
are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. If (G0
 –LG(L)) is invertible, the structural form equation
can also be written in the following moving average representation.
                                                                                                                                                                    
shocks. However, they do not consider the case in which taste shocks feed back on output, which would
bias their estimates.
8 One reason that we do not introduce the time fixed effect explicitly is to avoid the well-known bias in the
case of both fixed effect and lagged independent variable. Refer to Hsiao (1986)9
yt
i = d* + G(L)*et (0.7)
where d* = (G0
 –LG(L))
-1 d, G(L)* = (G0
 –LG(L))
-1 G(L), and G(0)* = G0
-1.
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equation from
the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. This paper employs two different
methods. The first imposes restrictions on the contemporaneous structural parameters G0 while
the second imposes restrictions on the long run structural parameters G(1)
*.
In the first method, following Sims (1980), we postulate a recursive structure on the
contemporaneous parameters G0 in order to recover the parameters in the structural form
equation. In the second method, following Blanchard and Quah (1989), we assume a recursive
structure in the long run structural parameter G(1)
*.
2.3.2. The System with SR restrictions
First, we estimate the model with contemporaneous restrictions. The data vector is {D log
GDP, D log GDP - D log GNP, D log GNP - D log GDI, D log GDI - D log C}. Again, note that all
variables are deviations from the growth rate of own regional aggregates. In all estimations in this
paper, we obtain D log C as the difference between D log GDP and the sum of all other variables
using the national income identity. Like previous researchers, we interpret the size changes in
GNP GDP log log D - D ,  GDI GNP log log D - D , and  C GDI log log D - D  in reaction to
exogenous shocks changing D log GDP as measures of risk sharing achieved by capital markets,
international transfers, and credit markets, respectively, and the size of changes in  C log D  as the
unsmoothed part.
Our identifying restrictions based on equation  (0.6) are:





















































































































That is, we assume a recursive structure on the contemporaneous structural parameters.  Though
this system does not consider some contemporaneous feedback among variables, it does not10
impose any restrictions on dynamic (lagged) feedback among them. In that sense, this system is
more general than the static model described above, which does not consider any (dynamic)
lagged interactions of this sort.
Using the static system, previous studies examined how D log GDP is smoothed by
different channels of risk sharing by regarding D log GDP as exogenous. Instead, we examine
how eGDP is smoothed by different channels of risk sharing by regarding eGDP as exogenous. Our
measure of exogenous output change is more general since in our system eGDP is constructed as
conditional on information about the history of all variables in the system. In practice, the system
in (0.4) is a special case of our specification, with the coefficients g32, g42, g43, g52, g53, g54 and
G(L) all equal to zero.
On the other hand, we interpret ek,1, eg,2, and ec,3, as shocks to each risk sharing channel,
that is, shocks to capital market, shocks to international transfers, shocks to credit market. They
are surprises in risk sharing channels, conditional on all lagged variables in the system and on
contemporaneous output (and some other risk sharing channels). By tracing the impulse
responses of all variables, we can examine whether each risk sharing channel is a substitute or a
complement for the others. For example, we can investigate how much the role of other risk
sharing channels such as credit channel decreases (or increases) given GDP when there is an
unexpectedly large increase in risk sharing through the capital market. In this respect, the
inclusion of the contemporaneous value of GDP in those equations is important since we can
control for its changes.
Regarding the contemporaneous restrictions among those risk sharing channels, we rely
on the natural properties and interpretations of each channel. First, we assume that the credit
channel is contemporaneously affected by all others since consumers would decide how much to
save after considering the risk sharing done by other channels such as international transfers and
capital market smoothing. Second, the ordering between international transfers (or federal
government transfers) and capital market might be more controversial, but we assume that capital
market smoothing comes first because federal income taxes are based on capital income too, so
that it must be known before the tax is levied. At any rate, we examine the robustness of our
results under alternative identifying assumption in Section 4.
We estimate the model using not only yearly data but also quarterly data when they are
available. By using quarterly data, the restrictions are on quarterly interactions. In such a case,
our identifying assumptions become weaker because we allow interactions among variables
within a year, and our measure of eGDP becomes more exogenous.11
2.3.3. System with LR restrictions
We use the same data vector as that in the system with SR restrictions. Our identifying











































































Note that the 5·5 matrix on the RHS is the long run structural coefficients, G(1). Therefore, eGDP
represents the structural shocks that may affect all variables in the long run; eK1, eK2, eK3, and eK4
are structural shocks that do not affect the level of regional output in the long run. Then, we can
attach some interesting structural interpretations to the shocks. eGDP is the permanent shock to
GDP; other structural shocks can tentatively be interpreted as temporary shocks to GDP since it is
difficult to justify any LR recursive structure among risk sharing channels. However, they turned
out to be similar to shocks to each risk sharing channel (Refer to Section 3.).
Also note that our restrictions are only on the long run structural coefficients and we do
not impose any other restrictions on G(L)
*. Therefore, all variables are endogenously determined
by considering all contemporaneous and lagged interactions. Again, a model like (0.4) can be
considered as a special case of our system since it does not allow contemporaneous and lagged
interactions.
In the following sections, we examine impulse responses of D log GDP,
GNP GDP log log D - D ,  GDI GNP log log D - D ,  C GDI log log D - D , and  C log D  to each
structural shock to analyze the dynamic risk sharing properties under each structural shock.
3. Basic Results
3.1. Data and Estimation
Our analysis of international risksharing within OECD (and EU) countries uses National
Accounts data for 23 countries from 2 sources: the International Monetary Fund's International
Financial Statistics Yearbook, various issues and CD, supplemented, where available, by the
monthly issues (period 1956--1990); and the OECD's Statistical Compendium on CD, for both
annual data (period 1960--1997) and quarterly data (period 1980-I--1998-IV). Our variables are
derived from the National Accounts as follows:
• GDP (gross domestic product)12
• GNP (gross national product) = GDP + net factor income from abroad
• GDI (gross disposable income) = GNP + net transfers from abroad9
• C (total consumption) = GDI - (depreciation + fixed investments + inventory change
+ trade balance)
As for the United States, our data are the same as those constructed by ASY, and we refer
to their data appendix for a detailed description. However, we augmented the dataset with the
state CPI series, constructed by Del Negro (1998). The list of variables is:
• GSP (gross state product)
• SI (state income) = GSP + net factor income from other states
• DI (state disposable income) = SI - federal taxes + federal transfers
• C (state consumption) = DI - (investment + interstate trade balance)
It is important to point out that the US data lack measures of investment at the state level,
so that it is impossible to disentangle interstate smoothing from domestic smoothing.
In estimating VAR equations, we included 2 lags and a constant term in all equations.10
All variables are in real per capita terms, and are constructed by deflating nominal values by
domestic CPI, and dividing by population. Each variable is then subtracted from the aggregate
measure. The aggregate measure of each variable's growth rate is constructed based on domestic
growth rates, where the weight is driven by the relative size of GDP in 1990. In the extended
model, we use nominal exchange rates, defined as the amount of national currency exchanged for
one US dollar at mid-year or mid-quarter.
3.2. The United States
Figure 1 reports impulse responses with two standard error bands over 5 years in the
system with the SR restrictions. Each column shows the impulse responses of all interested
variables to each structural shock.  The name of each structural shock is noted at the top of each
column while the names of the responding variables are noted at the far left of each row. “GSP”
“KAP,” “GOV,” “CRE,” and “C” represent  GSP log D ,  SI GSP log log D - D ,
DI SI log log D - D ,  C DI log log D - D , and  C log D , respectively. Therefore, they depict the
changes in GSP, capital market smoothing, smoothing by Federal Government, credit market
smoothing, and unsmoothed part. Note that our data do not allow to separate capital depreciation
and retained earnings from state income, so that our KAP measures smoothing through these two
                                                       
9 Net transfers from National Accounts are unavailable in IFS sources.
10 Using higher lags does not change results much in most cases.13
channels besides capital market smoothing.11 The scales of all the graphs in each column are the
same.
First, we examine the effects of exogenous GSP shocks (in the first column in Figure 1).
To examine the exact numbers, we also report the responses in Table 1 (1). For Table 1(1), we
normalize the size of the shocks so that the sum of total changes in GSP over time is 100. In
addition, we also report the exact numbers with standard error in the parenthesis in Table 1 (1). In
Table 1 (2), we report cumulative impulse responses in order to examine the cumulative role of
each risk sharing channel over time.
Table 1. Impulse Responses to eGDP in the System with SR restrictions, U.S. States
1) Impulse Responses
GSP KAP GOV CRE C
0 year 74.9 (1.6) 34.7 (1.3) 7.3 (0.8) 20.9 (2.5) 12.0 (2.3)
1 year 22.4 (2.3) 3.1 (1.4)  7.1 (0.8) 6.1 (2.5) 6.1 (2.3)
2 year 2.9 (2.1) -1.6 (1.4) 1.3 (0.9) -9.4 (2.5) 12.5 (2.3)
3 year -0.1 (1.3) -0.1 (0.6) -0.2 (0.4) -3.7 (1.1) 3.9 (1.0)
4 year 0.1 (0.7) -0.2 (0.3) -0.3 (0.2) -0.4 (0.5) 1.0 (0.6)
2) Cumulative Impulse Responses
GSP KAP GOV CRE C
0 year 74.9 (1.6) 34.7 (1.3) 7.3 (0.8) 20.9 (2.5) 12.0 (2.3)
1 year 97.3 (3.1) 37.9 (2.0) 14.4 (1.2) 27.0 (3.3) 18.1 (3.1)
2 year 100.1 (4.1) 36.3 (2.5) 15.7 (1.4) 17.6 (4.1) 30.6 (4.0)
3 year 100.0 (4.8) 36.2 (2.7) 15.4 (1.5) 13.9 (4.5) 34.4 (4.6)
4 year 100.0 (5.1) 36.0 (2.7) 15.1 (1.5) 13.5 (4.6) 35.4 (4.9)
From the impulse responses of GSP, we can infer the nature of the shocks. On impact,
GSP increases sharply and also shows a positive response in the next year. From two years after
the shocks, GSP is not much different from zero. As shown in the scale, the impact increase in
GSP is 74.9% of total GSP increases, and the increase in the next period is about 22.4%.
In response to such an exogenous shock to GSP, a large capital market smoothing
(34.7%) is found on impact, but in the next period, a little smoothing (3.5%) is found, and later
the capital market does not play much role. Overall capital market smoothing contributes about
36.0% of total GSP changes. In the first two periods, smoothing by the Federal government is
significant, 7.3% and 7.1%, respectively. Overall, the contribution is more than 15.1%. Credit
market contributes 20.9% on impact, about 6.1% in the next period. However, in the second and
                                                       
11 In any case, SY have illustrated how those two channels are unlikely to affect the capital smoothing
measure.14
third years after the shocks, a significant negative contribution is found, -9.4% and –3.7%,
respectively. Overall, credit market smoothes 13.5 % of total GSP shocks. Consumption (UNS)
increases up to three years after the shocks. Overall, 35.4% of the GDP changes are unsmoothed.
The impulse responses show different dynamic roles of the different risk sharing
channels. Most smoothing by capital market occurs on impact while smoothing by credit market
occurs over time and it is positive initially but negative later. The results are consistent with our
interpretations of the capital market smoothing; however, the behavior of credit market
smoothing is somewhat difficult to be explained clearly.
Capital market smoothing insures uncertain future contingencies. Parts of capital market
smoothing such as capital gains and dividends may occur almost on impact when there are
unexpected changes in expected current and future income, though some other components, such
as interest payments, may accrue whether the income change is expected or not. Therefore, a
substantial part of smoothing by capital market is achieved on impact when the nature of the
shock is revealed.12
However, it is not so easy to explain the credit market smoothing based on traditional
theories of consumption smoothing.  We may regard the credit market smoothing (at least part of
it) as intertemporal trade. Following traditional theory on consumption smoothing or
intertemporal trade, in the presence of AR-1 output growth rate shocks with a positive AR-1
coefficient, consumption growth rate in the first period should be more volatile than output
growth rate while consumption growth rate in the later period should be less volatile than output.
However, we find the opposite regarding the relative volatility of consumption and output, even
though the GSP dynamics in our model is similar to the AR-1 output growth rate shocks with a
positive AR-1 coefficient. This problematic relative volatility between consumption and output is
known as “Deaton’s paradox.” We suggest three possible explanations for this behavior of
consumption. First, we rely on  imperfect information of consumers. Suppose the GSP shocks are
a mixture of permanent and temporary shocks in the level of GSP. When a shock hits, consumers
don’t know which shock is realized, so initially they smooth a little (or lend). However, in later
periods, consumers realize that the shocks is very persistent, (as shown in the results for the long-
run restrictions below), and borrow in the face of an increasing permanent income level.
Alternatively, we may interpret that consumers smooth the growth rate of consumption, instead
of the level of consumption. In such a case, the dynamics are consistent with consumption growth
                                                       
12 Note that the role of capital market is very small in the one year after the shock. Even though we find a
substantial increase in GSP (22%), it is already expected in the one year after the shock. (It is already15
rate smoothing. Since the GSP is higher for the first two periods, consumers save for the first two
periods. In the next two periods, consumers use the saving. As a result, consumption is smoothed
over the four periods.13 Finally, all these problems may be properties of a production economy
subject to productivity shocks or other structural shocks generating such GSP dynamics,
regarding which we do not have a full-fledged theory.
Finally, most smoothing by the Federal Government occurs within two years. It suggests
that smoothing by the Federal Government seems to be based on the current value (and possibly
one period lagged value) of GSP.
In general, these results are consistent with previous studies by ASY, Del Negro (1998),
and others, in that they reveal that a large fraction of a shock is smoothed across states in the US,
and that the role of private markets as compared to the tax/transfer system is preponderant for
risksharing. However, impulse responses convey a more informative picture on the evolution over
time of smoothing responses. The first original result is that it takes some time to absorb a shock,
even with automatic stabilizers like cross-state capital income payments or taxes. In the former
case, the adjustment lag of about 3 years may be due to the structure of cross-state payments in
the US (interest payments may not accrue annually, as in zero-coupon bonds), to capital
depreciation or  retained earnings (both included in the measure of state income). As for fiscal
smoothing, certain taxes (and subsidies) may refer to events occurred years before (e.g., refunds).
The credit market channel presents an additional feature deserving attention: 2 years after the
shock on average, credit flows have a dis-smoothing role, that is they flow towards the state hit
two years before by a positive shock. As a result, the cumulative response of credit markets is
lower than the impact response, and lower than it had been previously estimated in other studies.
Since this channel measures both interstate and intrastate smoothing, it is possible that – as
mentioned above -- intertemporal smoothing considerations may affect the behavior of savings
over time.
Next, we examine the impulse responses of shocks to each risk sharing channel (in the
second, third, and fourth columns in Figure 1). First, the positive shocks to credit market and
Federal government payment system does not affect other variables much except for own variable
and consumption. That is, an increase in saving or federal government net transfers does not
affect other risk sharing channels. Also note that GSP does not change much. As a result, the
increase in saving or Federal government net transfers just decreases the unsmoothed part (C).
                                                                                                                                                                    
reflected in the capital market smoothing in the first period.) We still find some positive role of capital
market one year after the shocks, which may reflect interests and other prearranged payments.16
However, the shocks to capital market do affect all variables significantly. First, an
increase in net factor income decreases saving -- and smoothing through savings -- significantly.
The size of the impact increase and the impact decrease are similar, which implies that an
increase in the capital market channel crowds out the credit market channel almost perfectly. We
also find a small decrease in Federal government net transfers. Overall, an increase in net factor
income is almost perfectly offset by decreases in other channels on impact. As a result,
consumption does not change at all on impact. In the next period, GSP increases and most part of
the increase is smoothed by the credit channel. Probably this effect is due to the impact on
productivity of financial income. This is an example of a feedback from risksharing channels to
output that was neglected by previous studies, and that may help assess the relative importance of
these channels for smoothing purposes; indeed, if a change in capital markets is destabilizing for
output, this may prompt to reconsider their overall role in smoothing disturbances.
The above results on shocks to each risk sharing channel have another interesting policy
implication. The Federal Government’s attempt to increase risk sharing within U.S. states via
taxes and transfers is crucial, in that other relatively private market mechanisms cannot substitute
them automatically. For example, suppose the Federal Government reduces the overall level of
taxes and transfers in a particular year. In such a case, market mechanisms do not help to make up
for the lost income insurance. On the other hand, the capital market’s failure in hedging income in
a particular year is mostly rescued by the credit market channel, though there may be some
differences in terms of permanent income.14
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses to permanent shocks to GSP in the system with
LR restrictions. In general, we find similar quantitative results to those in the model with SR
restrictions. This may imply that most of the shocks to GSP identified in the model with SR
restrictions are permanent shocks. In response to GSP shocks, compared to the system with SR
restrictions, smoothing by capital markets and the Federal Government plays a slightly larger role
while smoothing by credit markets plays a slightly smaller role. The unsmoothed part becomes
slightly smaller. Since eGSP in the system with SR restrictions may be a mixture of temporary and
permanent shocks to GSP, the larger role played by capital markets and smaller role of credit
markets confirm what other authors, such as ASY, suggested, namely that, credit markets are less
suitable than capital markets to deal with persistent (or permanent) shocks. Indeed, when negative
                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Suppose that credit channel does not change at all. Then, the first two period consumption would be far
higher than the next two period consumption.
14 The sharp contrast between Federal Government and capital market is robust under different identifying
assumptions. For example, when we change the ordering of KAP and GOV, still we find a similar result,17
shocks are persistent, lenders may reduce loans, whereas when positive shocks persist, they may
decide to transfer the boon on consumption.
Impulse responses to other structural shocks are also similar to those in the system with
SR restrictions. Though we do not attempt to interpret those structural shocks in the previous
section, they may be interpreted as shocks to each risk sharing channels. Given this similarity
with the SR model, we may conclude that the results on shocks to risk sharing channels seem to
be quite general.
3.3. OECD and Europe
We report the results for 23 OECD countries and 15 EU countries15, using OECD data.
Since results for the model with LR restrictions and the model with SR restrictions are
qualitatively similar, we only report the results for the model with SR restrictions. Figure 3 and
Table 3 report results for 23 OECD countries while Figure 4 and Table 4 report results for 15 EU
countries.
Table 3. Impulse Responses to eGDP in the System with SR restrictions, OECD 23
1) Impulse Responses
GDP KAP GOV CRE C
0 year 71.5 (1.9) 0.7 (0.5) -0.2 (0.3) 32.0 (1.9) 38.9 (1.7)
1 year 23.7 (2.8) -0.7 (0.5) -0.4 (0.3) -1.0 (2.0) 25.8 (2.4)
2 year 3.5 (2.9) -0.6 (0.5) -0.4 (0.3) -7.1 (1.8) 11.6 (2.3)
3 year 1.0 (2.0) 0.0 (0.4) 0.2 (0.2) -1.5 (1.0) 2.3 (1.7)
4 year 0.5 (1.2) 0.2 (0.2) 0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.6) 0.1 (1.2)
5 year -0.1 (0.5) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.2) -0.2 (0.6)
2) Cumulative Impulse Responses
GDP KAP GOV CRE C
0 year 71.5 (1.9) 0.7 (0.5)  -0.2 (0.3) 32.0 (1.9) 38.9 (1.7)
1 year 95.1 (3.9) 0.1 (0.8)  -0.6 (0.5) 31.0 (2.7) 64.7 (3.2)
2 year 98.6 (5.6) -0.5 (1.1)  -1.0 (0.6) 23.9 (3.2) 76.3 (4.7)
3 year 99.6 (6.8) -0.5 (1.4)  -0.8 (0.7) 22.4 (3.4) 78.6 (5.7)
4 year 100.1 (7.3) -0.3 (1.5)  -0.6 (0.7) 22.5 (3.3) 78.6 (6.3)
5 year 100.0 (7.5) -0.2 (1.6) -0.6 (0.7) 22.4 (3.3) 78.4 (6.6)
Table 4. Impulse Responses to eGDP in the System with SR restrictions, EU 15
1) Impulse Responses
                                                                                                                                                                    
though changes in net factor income tend to substitute for changes in Federal Government net transfers
slightly.18
GDP KAP GOV CRE UNS
0 year 72.4 (2.5) 2.3 (0.7) -0.3 (0.5) 36.3 (2.3) 34.1 (2.1)
1 year 18.9 (3.7) -0.8 (0.8) -0.9 (0.5) -0.5 (2.6) 21.0 (2.7)
2 year 2.8 (3.4) -1.3 (0.9) -0.8 (0.5) -7.8 (2.5) 12.7 (2.5)
3 year 3.0 (2.0) -0.5 (0.6) 0.2 (0.3) -2.1 (1.3) 5.5 (1.8)
4 year 2.2 (1.5) -0.1 (0.4) 0.4 (0.2) -0.7 (0.9) 2.7 (1.4)
5 year 0.7 (0.9) 0.0 (0.3) 0.1 (0.1) -0.5 (0.4) 1.1 (1.0)
2) Cumulative Impulse Responses
GDP KAP GOV CRE UNS
0 year 72.4 (2.5) 2.3 (0.7)  -0.3 (0.5) 36.3 (2.3)  34.3 (2.1)
1 year 91.2 (4.8) 1.5 (1.3)  -1.2 (0.8) 35.8 (3.6)  55.1 (3.8)
2 year 94.0 (6.6) 0.3 (1.8)  -2.0 (1.0) 28.0 (4.3)  67.8 (5.3)
3 year 97.1 (7.6) -0.3 (2.1)  -1.8 (1.1) 25.8 (4.6)  73.3 (6.4)
4 year 99.3 (8.3) -0.4 (2.3)  -1.4 (1.1) 25.1 (4.6)  76.0 (7.2)
5 year 100.0 (8.3) -0.4 (2.5) -1.3 (1.2) 24.7 (4.7) 77.0 (7.8)
Results for 23 OECD and 15 EU countries are qualitatively similar, and both are
somewhat different from the results for the U.S. states. Again, in response to the eGDP shocks,
GDP responds mostly for the first two years, though the response is a little more delayed and we
find larger increases two and more years after the shocks. In contrast to the U.S., capital market
and international transfers do not play a very significant role. Among 23 OECD countries, the
estimates of either channel are not statistically significant. Among the 15 EU countries,
smoothing through international transfers is not statistically significant while capital market
smoothing plays a small positive role on impact (2.3%) and no significant role overall. Among
these countries, most smoothing is achieved through the credit channel  (overall about 22-25%).
We find a similar dynamic behavior of credit smoothing to that among the U.S. states. On impact,
a significant positive smoothing is found while a significant negative smoothing is found for two
and three years after the shock. Overall 77-79% of GDP changes are not smoothed, which is far
larger than the size of the unsmoothed part among the U.S. states.
These results confirm the international risksharing puzzle, but reveal that the dynamic
response of international credit markets to GDP shocks is extremely similar to that of domestic
credit markets in the US: an initial smoothing via lending and borrowing is followed, after about
3 years, by plain dis-smoothing. The alternance between smoothing and dis-smoothing helps
explain why different authors have failed to agree on the "static" measure of credit markets
risksharing. Unfortunately, other conclusions on the similarity between the US and the
international pattern of credit market smoothing would be unwarranted, because we cannot
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 They are Australia, Belgium,19
separate domestic investment from interstate lending and borrowing in the U.S states and we
cannot compare international provision of credit separately. More importantly, however,
systematic differences between domestic and international smoothing seem to disappear in the
case of credit markets: to find the reason for the existence of the international risksharing puzzle,
as opposed to domestic risksharing, we should perhaps look elsewhere.
The responses to shocks to each risk sharing channel are similar to the U.S. in some
cases, but slightly different in others. First, an increase in saving does not change international
transfers or net factor income, as in the U.S. Second, an increase in net factor income decreases
saving as in the U.S. However, the size of the decrease in saving is about half the size of the
increase in net factor income. That is, a rise in net factor income crowds out saving only by half.
Finally, now an increase in international government transfers also decreases saving, which is not
observed in the U.S. state case. The size of decrease in saving is even larger than the increase in
the international transfers on impact. Therefore, policy implications are quite different from the
U.S. state case. The credit market channel now substitutes for international government transfers
even more than it does for the capital market channel. In order to better understand which
components of saving are mainly responsible for these results, we now turn to analyze how
saving is decomposed into domestic gross investment and the trade balance.
4. Extended System
4.1.  Components of Saving in OECD and EU Countries
Since the credit market (or saving) is the only risk sharing channel that works
significantly among OECD and EU countries, we further examine its role in detail. We divide
saving into four components – capital depreciation (DEP), net fixed investment (NFINV),
inventories (INVT), and trade balance (TB).16
We use the following ordering in our recursive system: DEP, NFINV, TB, INVT. First,
we include inventories last since they are computed as residuals by definition. Second, we include
capital depreciation, because it applies to last year’s capital formulation. Third, we assume net
fixed investment affects the trade balance contemporaneously (not vice versa) since people may
decide the domestic use of saving first, and then decide its foreign use.
Figure 5 and 6 report the impulse responses to each structural shock in the system with
SR restrictions in 23 OECD and 15 EU countries, respectively. In response to eGDP shocks, DEP
                                                       
16 From National Accounts identities, S = I +X-M, where S is national saving, I is gross total investment (further
decomposable into net fixed investment, inventory investment and capital depreciation), X represents exports and M20
decreases slightly in the first two years, NFINV increases a lot in the first three years, TB
increases significantly in the first period, but decreases later, and INVT increases in the first two
periods but decreases in the next two years. Among these, NFINV plays the most significant role
in the first period, absorbing about 15 % of total GSP changes, and overall about 25% of total
GDP changes. TB smoothes about 5-10% in the first period, but dis-smoothes about 5-10% in
each of the second and the third period, so that overall it dis-smoothes about 5-10%. INVT
smoothes about 10-13% on impact, but in the third and fourth year it dis-smoothes about 5%,
averaging at 5-7% overall.
These results shed light on the domestic (as opposed to international) extent of credit
smoothing among OECD countries. Of the total 36% smoothing on impact occurring through this
channel, the bulk (about 30%) takes place domestically, that is, without any international
risksharing. If we consider overall smoothing, of the total 25% smoothing, a whopping 35% is
achieved domestically (mainly through gross fixed investments) on impact, with the trade balance
even playing an overall dis-smoothing role. The above breakdown also helps explain the timing
pattern of credit smoothing. It is apparent that both inventories and the trade balance are
responsible for the dis-smoothing behavior of the credit channel after the third year. While the
volatility of inventories is hardly a surprise, the trade balance appears to behave according to
intertemporal patterns predicted by the theory in case of an output shock that turns out to be
persistent. The behavior of the trade balance, therefore, comes to the forefront as one of the main
culprits of the timing of the credit market response; this is a novel result that had been overlooked
by previous analyses.
Next, we examine the impulse responses to other structural shocks. First, about two-
thirds of an initial increase in net factor income is offset by a decrease in the trade balance. We
also observe a little increase in depreciation. In the next period, a substantial part of the increase
in net factor income is offset by the decrease in inventories. Second, the most part of the increase
in international government transfers is offset by a decrease in trade balance.  Third, the most part
of the increase in capital depreciation is offset by the decrease in the other three channels of
saving. The size of the decrease in each channel is similar. Fourth, the most part of the increase in
net fixed investment is offset by the decrease in trade balance. Fifth, some of the increase in trade
balance is offset by the decrease in inventories. Finally, an increase in inventories does not affect
other risk sharing channels (due to our identifying assumption), but the following year a little
decrease in inventories is observed, which is offset by an increase in the trade balance. In
                                                                                                                                                                    
imports of goods and services. We exclude net factor income and international transfers from saving since they are
already separated as the difference between GDP and GNP, and GNP and GDI.21
summary, shocks to each risk sharing channel are offset by change in trade balance in most
cases.17 The logic behind this result is that, as alternative means to smooth income increase, the
discrepancy between saving and investment shrinks, and the size of the trade balance
automatically declines.
4.2. The Role of Relative Price across Countries
The variables used in our risksharing regressions are deflated using own state (country)’s
CPI.18 But since state (national) prices may respond as well to output shocks, it is important to
examine whether the results we obtained above were driven by the relative dynamics of prices.
There are sound theoretical reasons to expect both a smoothing and a dis-smoothing effect of
relative prices. Centering the discussion on relative supply shocks, as we have done up to now,
open-economies real exchange rate models, as in Obstfeld (1985), suggest that positive
productivity shocks create an excess supply which reduces relative prices; on the contrary, when
differences between tradable and non-tradable sectors are considered, as in the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis, positive productivity shocks, which mainly benefit tradable sectors, result
in relative price increases.
To examine the role of relative prices in risk sharing, we need to extend the basic model.
In the case of the U.S. states, the smoothing role of prices can be derived by considering nominal
consumption deflated by the national CPI index (P), which we denote 
* i
t C , instead of nominal
consumption deflated by the state CPI index, as in 
i
t C above. By appending this new term into





















GSP = , (0.10)
and the system of equations (0.4) becomes:
                                                       
17 This result is robust under alternative identifying assumptions.
18 In the case of U.S. states, the results in Section 3 used variables deflated by aggregate U.S. CPI since the
results are similar to those using variables deflated by each state’s CPI and each state’s CPI is available
only from 1969.23
recursive system with two additional equations, one measuring the response of relative prices, the
other reflecting the reaction of the nominal exchange rate to output and other shocks. Again, all
variables are deviations from own regional aggregates.
Regarding the identifying restrictions, we include the new variables as the last ones in
equations (0.8) and (0.9). That is, the new variables are assumed to be affected by all variables in
the system with SR restrictions while the shocks to the new variables do not affect any basic
variables in the long run.
Table 5 reports the results. We report only results from the system with SR restrictions
since results from the one with LR restrictions are similar. We do not report the responses of real
variables, since response of real variables are similar to the basic systems. For the OECD and EU
countries, we also report the implied real exchange rate changes due to exchange rate and CPI
changes.















0 year 1.1 (0.6) -23.1 (2.6) -19.7 (3.2) -35.3 (8.4) -23.1 (11.4) -12.0 -3.4
1 year 1.7 (0.5) 4.0 (3.6) 4.9 (4.4) -28.4 (8.9) -33.1 (13.9) -32.4 -38.0
2 year 0.0 (0.6) 18.3 (4.0) 15.4 (5.2) -15.3 (9.1) -31.8 (13.4) -33.8 -47.2
3 year 0.3 (0.3) 23.1 (4.0) 19.0 (5.2) 12.0 (7.4) -0.1 (10.3) -11.1 -19.1
4 year 0.2 (0.2) 23.5 (3.9) 20.6 (5.0) 26.7 (5.7) 21.3 (9.1) -2.2 -0.7
5 year 0.0 (0.1) 21.7 (3.7) 19.7 (4.8) 26.9 (4.6) 24.9 (7.2) 2.2 5.2
First of all, in the U.S. states, in response to shocks to GSP, the CPI growth rate increases
over two years, thereby slightly smoothing output shocks. However, the increases are relatively
small; a 1% increase in the growth rate of GSP (over a few years) increases less than 0.04%
overall. Such a small relative price change does not seem to have much risksharing effects across
U.S. states.  In contrast, in OECD and EU countries, the CPI growth rate decreases for the first
year, but increases for the second year and after, while the exchange rate growth rate decreases
for the first three years but increases later. As a result, the real exchange rate growth rate
decreases for most years up to four years after the shocks.
The result on CPI is clearly to be interpreted as a sluggish response of prices, which
decline (increase) initially after a positive (negative) output shock, to then gradually rise (fall) to
smooth a remarkable fraction of the output shock overall (a whopping 77% for OECD). This
novel result appears to lend weight to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis of a price system
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 See for example Eichengreen.(1997).24
reacting positively to productivity shocks. An equally interesting behavior is displayed by the
nominal exchange rate, which also has a dis-smoothing effect at first, but provides some
smoothing later. This means that the exchange rate appreciates initially in the face of a positive
shock to output (both the simple  monetary theory and more complex microfundation general
equilibrium theories of the nominal exchange rate21 can rationalize such a result), but then
depreciates in the longer run (and this is harder to justify without invoking the driving role of CPI
inflation). Finally, the real exchange rate appears to play a more important role than had
previously been estimated22 : it is only in the longer run that it becomes negligible, since nominal
exchange rate changes and inflation changes offset each other. The implications of these results
for the smoothing pattern of monetary unions are crucial for the debate on the effectiveness of
exchange rate policy and the optimality of currency areas. In the short run, the real exchange rate
(as well as the nominal rate) appears to work against stabilization of output shocks, due to
sluggishness in price adjustment. From this point of view, removing the exchange rate instrument
through the creation of a monetary union may not subtract an important stabilization channel
from the toolbox of monetary authorities. At most, in a few years' time, real exchange rates have
no smoothing role, as prices adjust to the initial output disturbance.
5. Conclusion
We have used a structural panel VAR model to analyze channels of interstate risksharing
among the states of the US from 1963 to 1990, as well as channels of international risksharing
among 23 OECD countries from 1960 to 1990 and the 15 EU members from 1960 to 1990. We
have obtained several results worth discussing.
In the US, the bulk of risksharing is provided through private channels (capital markets
and credit markets), while fiscal risksharing is very limited. The response of each channel to
output shocks is not exhausted on impact, but lingers over time, and credit markets exhibit a dis-
smoothing effect after the first two years. Potential explanations of this behavior may have to do
with intertemporal smoothing patterns embedded in the credit market channel.
We also investigated the response of each channel and consumption to other channels'
shocks, finding that consumption obviously reacts also in response to shocks not involving output
(for example, changes in the availability or cost of credit); therefore our controlling for alternative
smoothing channels in the estimation of risksharing seems to be vindicated. While shocks to
fiscal and credit channels elicit no response from capital markets, shocks to capital markets
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affecting cross-state income flows crowd out the credit channel almost completely. This result
testifies to a strong substitution between the two smoothing mechanisms, that was impossible to
detect in regressions only involving output as a regressor.23 The response to the fiscal channel has
the interesting policy implication that Federal Government’s attempts to increase risk sharing
within U.S. states via taxes and transfers is crucial, for other relatively private market
mechanisms cannot substitute them automatically.
All these results are essentially confirmed in the impulse response analysis with long run
restrictions (which identify the response to permanent output shocks). This suggests that most of
the output shocks in our sample are permanent. Finally, an analysis of interstate price risksharing
suggests that in the US such a smoothing mechanism is not at work.
Turning to the 23 OECD countries, we confirmed that most risksharing on impact takes
place through the credit market channel, and the impulse response presents the same pattern as
the US credit market smoothing: an initial smoothing is followed after two years by a dis-
smoothing behavior. Since international data allow to break down the credit channel into the
components of saving (capital depreciation, net fixed investment, inventory change and trade
balance), we could separate the credit channel smoothing into domestic smoothing (through gross
total capital formation) and international smoothing (through the trade balance). This detailed
analysis revealed that the bulk of smoothing is actually carried out through domestic investment
(and in particular net fixed investment), rather than via lending and borrowing internationally.24
From the analysis of shocks to risksharing channels, we learned that most of these shocks
are offset, at least partially, by changes in other smoothing channels -- in particular, the trade
balance is especially reactive to changes in financial and credit markets. This points to a large
substitutability of smoothing channels and therefore to a possible unifying decisional mechanism
that presides to them all.
Further investigation disclosed the smoothing role that the real exchange rate exhibits
across countries: an initial dis-smoothing effect -- mainly induced by changes in the nominal
exchange rate -- that peters out over time -- as relative prices adjust. One interpretation of the
counter-cyclical behavior of nominal exchange rates relies on the role of nominal interest rates in
response to the output shock. The policy implication of this result is fairly strong: at best, nominal
(and real) exchange rate changes provide no smoothing against idiosyncratic shocks to real
                                                       
23 To be sure, SUR estimations do involve the computation of cross-equation correlations, reflecting mutual influence
among the left-hand variables of the system in (0.4). However, these correlations have only been used to make point
estimates and standard errors more precise, not to assess dynamic responses among smoothing channels.26
output; at worst, they initially exacerbate them. Hence, the establishment of a monetary union in
Europe does not appear to have withdrawn from the monetary authorities' toolbox a crucial
stabilization instrument. Exploring the exact reasons and mechanism why this occurs is certainly
going to be a future research topic of great interest.
                                                                                                                                                                    
24 This is all the more true as we follow the dynamic response to the output shock, so that, cumulatively, gross total
capital formation smoothes even more than the overall credit smoothing, because the trade balance has a dis-smoothing
effect.27
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